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he video game industry in Japan is anything but
child's play. Annual sales of home game machines alone total
more than I trillion yen, close to 10 billion dollars.' Software,
which is priced much lower than the machines themselves,
has generated about 600 billion yen in sales, about 5 billion
dollars per year.' More than 200 companies compete in the
production of games, employing some 23,000 people. In the
year 2000, they produced 1,400 titles.'
While hardware sales have remained relatively
steady,4 software sales have declined, by some estimates
dramatically so.The Ministry of EconomyTrade, and Industry
(METI) shows sales in the year 2000 to be 70.8% of the
1997 peak figures.' Yet, with the introduction of new
hardware systems such as Sony Playstation II, Nintendo Game
Cube,and Microsoft X Box, it hardly seems likely that players
are simply holding on to old games. (Video game enthusiasts
are not known for their restraint in the presence of new
challenges.) According to the software industry, the
explanation for the decline in software sales is that consumer
demand is being met by a vigorous resale industry, in which
dealers buy and sell used game software.6
In search of relief from this problem, video game
authors turned to the protections afforded by Japanese
copyright law.The copyright law, however, failed to alleviate
the authors' concerns because it actually offered comfort
to the resellers. Under the "first sale" doctrine of copyright
law, the lawful owner of a copyrighted item has the right to
sell that item without incurring any duty to pay additional
copyright royalties. Thus, for example, part of the price of a
new book goes to the author of that book. His revenue
comes at the first sale. At any subsequent sale, when the
person who initially purchased that book decides to sell it
to someone else, the author receives nothing from that
transaction.The transaction is strictly between the new buyer
and the individual reselling the book.
Of course, the author is able to sell other, new copies
of the same title, and for these he receives royalties. However,
to the extent that readers can readily obtain used copies in
suitable condition at lower prices, they are less likely to
purchase new ones. Thus, the number of people who may
have read a book will exceed the number of books sold and,
consequently, the number of instances in which the author
receives payment.
Given that reality, Japanese video game software
producers instead contend their product is not like a book,
but rather more like a motion picture. Under Japanese
copyright law, motion pictures are not subject to the first
sale doctrine. Rather, authors retain the right of distribution.8
It was based on this distinction that video game software
producers sought to end the resale business through litigation.
The lawsuits ultimately reached the Supreme Court of Japan.
In 1999, two cases were decided, one in the Tokyo
District Court and the other in the Osaka District Court,
both attempting to answer the question of how copyright
law should be applied to video games. In particular, the courts
were called upon to provide legal answers to two questions
that are both, essentially, a matter of art and, perhaps, physics:
what are cinematographic works? And, can video games be
classified as such?
According to the Copyright Law, cinematographic
works are "pictures that are expressed by making visual
and aural effects analogous to cinematography and fixed in
some tangible form.' 9 For such works, the author maintains
the right of distribution of copies.'0 That definition does
little to resolve the issue, for both the video game software
that one sees on a computer screen and movies that one
may watch on a cinema screen involve audiovisual images
arranged in a cinematographic manner.The similarity is all
the more apparent when one considers a particularly well-
established type of cinematographic work - animation.
The -o - o Case
The first of the two cases was filed in the Tokyo
District Court. Paradoxically, the Plaintiff in this case,Joushou
Company, was a seller of used games with 163 outlets, by
the name of "Chameleon Club," around the country. The
defendant, Enix Corporation, is a producer of game
software." Enix sent a letter to Joushou, demanding that it
stop reselling Enix-created products. Joushou responded by
filing suit, asking the court to issue a declaration of its rights.
The game software in question was made to work
with Playstation, Japan's leading platform.'2 Two specific game
titles were at issue. One title was "Star Ocean, Second Story"
a fantasy in which the main character travels through a virtual
land fraught with enemies. Another was called "Bust a Move"
It involved dancing and various competitions. Enix claimed
the cost of producing "Star Ocean Ir" was V 1,080,000,000,
and production of the dance title was somewhat less than
half that. Altogether, approximately $13 million was invested
in bringing the two games to market.
Rather than focusing directly on the statutory
definition of cinematographic works, theTokyo District Court
chose to look at the audience and the method of extracting
a profit from it. The court found differences in ways that
audiences make use of video games and traditional motion
pictures. For one thing, audiences in movie theatres, the court
said, all see the same movie in the same way, regardless of
space or time.' Audiences for game software,the court said,
are different.They are not passive recipients of an auteurs
vision but rather participants in the creative process. The
players can select various permutations of the work and
then actively affect its unfolding. For this reason, the Tokyo
District Court ruled that the
involvement of the player destroys
the conditions under which the
game software could be viewed as
Sokthe expression of the game author.4
The court then attempted
to further distinguish game
software from theatrical films by
looking at the way in which they are
distributed. Theatrical movies on
printed film, the court said,
are used in a way that audio-
visual expression is shown to a large audience at
one time.Therefore, individual reproductions have
significant economic value in the sense that they
produce large admission fee profits. Unlike the
distribution system for other works of which
many reproductions are sold directly to the
public, the reproductions of theatrical movies are
distributed in a business-to-business manner
(film-making companies, film distribution
companies, and theatre owners). Indeed, in some
cases, because of high costs, film-making
companies also control the distribution system
in order to recover their invested capital."
Speaking practically, rather than literally, the court
looked to "actual business circumstances"'6 and economic
value.Those circumstances and the value, however, were the
question in the lawsuit, not the answer. The litigation was
filed with the intent of determining what business
circumstances and rules would be and what economic value
could be attached to the works. Because the sequential
images were not confined to one particular pattern, theTokyo
District Court ruled in favor of the Plaintiff reseller, accepting
the first sale argument over the motion picture analogy.'7
Upon review, the Tokyo High Court affirmed the
holding of the District Court. 8 Looking to the market, the
High Court said that reproduction rights for cinematographic
works are based on the theatrical model, in which each copy
is used for a large number of people.Video game copies, on
the other hand, are produced in large numbers, each of which
is viewed by a small number of people at one time and-in
many cases-only one at a time. Thus, it concluded, the
software is not entitled to the same reproduction rights as
other cinematographic works. 9
The Osaka Case
The second case was filed in the Osaka District
Court.This time, the plaintiffs were producers of games for
Playstation and Sega Saturn: Capom, Konami, Square, and
Namco. Defendants were a franchiser of second-hand game
software stores, Akuto, and Raizu, one of its franchisees.
Thus, unlike theTokyo case, the Osaka litigation more closely
resembles the orthodox American approach, in which a party
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who claims to have already suffered damages sues.
In sharp contrast to the Tokyo District Court, the
Osaka District Court chose to look primarily at the statutory
language.The Osaka District Court also expressed the notion
that the law should be understood as setting the markers
for all kinds of expression: both those already well-known
and others not yet mature.The court took a straightforward
approach to the question, observing that cinematography
involves persistence of vision, presenting what are essentially
individual still images so rapidly as to fool the eye into
perceiving movement. In this, the court said, there is no
difference between theatrical films and video games.20
As for the involvement of the player, the court said
that whatever his contribution, the cinematographic results
are determined by the author of the game software.Thus, it
concluded, game software is included in whatever rights are
afforded to other cinematographic works. The statute, the
court said, does not create a category of cinematographic
works without right of distribution.What is available to one
is available to all.2' Thus, unlike the Tokyo District Court, the
Osaka District Court ruled in favor of the software
development companies.22 However, the Osaka High Court
reversed.23
The Osaka High Court looked to the game software
industry's own behavior as reason to exclude their products
from distribution protection. "Games:' the court said, "are
reproduced massively and sold directly to the public massively.
They are sold directly to end-users, unlike theatrical films.
Thus, the manufacturers are unable to control further
distribution by legitimate end-users who have lawfully
obtained their copies"24
The court viewed the cinematographic distribution
right, article 26(2), as an exception to the natural premise of
the free sale of goods. Adopting a social welfare stance, the
court said that protection of copyrighted works should be
conducted in harmony with the public interest. When an
object is transferred from buyer to seller, the seller should
ordinarily be able to assume that he can freely use the object
or sell it himself. A market economy depends on such
assumptions, it said. Producers of highly-regarded games can
receive compensation through the original sale price.There
is no need, the court said, to allow them a second profit
through circulation."
Thus the Osaka High Court ultimately concluded
that the video game software industry itself had chosen a
method of sales that was inconsistent with any reservation




Both the Tokyo and Osaka High Courts found that
video games are indeed "cinematographic works" included
within the statutory definition and ruled in favor of allowing
resale of games without compensation going to the original
seller. However, the Courts disagreed on the consequence
of this conclusion. The Tokyo High Court said the
reproductions were not copies in the same sense as movies,
because, unlike video games, individual copies of movies are
seen by large numbers of people at a time.The Osaka High
Court, on the other hand, looked more to ordinary notions
of "first sale." It was this contrast, along with the basic,
underlying issue of whether video game software is
cinematographic at all, that framed the argument for the
Supreme Court.
Like the High Courts, the Supreme Court
concluded that game software is, by all means,
"cinematography" as defined in the copyright law.2 7 Beyond
that, the Court agreed with the High Courts' position that
the reproduction right attendant to cinematography admits
of no distinction between various kinds of cinematographic
works. Thus, it found that video
game software authors do, in fact,
enjoy the same cinematographic
distribution rights as do movie
producers. Nevertheless, the Court
found in favor of the game resellers
The paradoxical
conclusion was reached by way of
the game producers' own conduct.
The Court said that while the
producers had the right of
distribution, they had exhausted that
right by distributing their work directly to the public.29 This
distinction, the Court admitted, is nowhere written in article
26. But article 26 needed to be interpreted, it said, as the law
made no mention of the applicability (or inapplicability) of the
first sale doctrine to cinematographic works. In its
interpretation, the Supreme Court reiterated the appeal of
the Osaka High Court to the social utility of the free market."
In this regard, the Court rejected any contention
that the meaning of article 26 is to be judged on the industry
as it stood when the law was enacted." The Court noted
that article 26 was designed to effectuate the provisions of
the Berne Copyright Convention,2 which was a recognition
of the need to protect the revenue stream for motion
pictures distributed for theatrical release. Despite this, it said,
. -NTERNET &TECHNOLOGY
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the language of the statute itself provides no basis for
distinguishing between older and newer forms of the
medium. As a result, the Court needed to look elsewhere
for a justification for treating game software differently.
The Court concluded that the video game
producers, who were seeking a judicial declaration to their
claim of distribution rights, had in effect given up any such
rights by doing business.33 The producers had asked for
judicial recognition of their position that they sold end-
users only the right to possess the game themselves, not
to redistribute them. But the Court observed that the trade
practices of the game software
producers differed dramatically
from those of feature film
producers, who only rent their
product to theatres and then insist
upon its return. Unlike feature film
producers, the game producers had
ceded control of their product by
placing it into the ordinary stream
of commerce, the court concluded.
Thus, it ruled that the producers
had abandoned their downstream
distribution rights, even while they
were insisting upon them.
3 4
In reaching this conclusion, the Court compared
the copyright issue to one it addressed in a patent case
several years earlier.35 In that case, the Court examined
the factors to be considered in deciding whether a patent
holder had exhausted its distribution rights. Recalling its
analysis in the previous case, the Court said:
I. Protection of an author's copyright must be
accomplished in harmony with the public interest.
2. When rights are transferred, the transferee may
reasonably believe that he has acquired whatever
rights were held by the transferor. In a copyright case,
that means that when an object is transferred, the
transferee believes that he too has acquired the right
to transfer to another. Were that not so, the free
circulation of products in the market would be
impeded, to the ultimate detriment of copyright
holders.
3. Authors already are paid when they assign their
works the first time. There is no need for them to
reap a windfall by profiting from subsequent
reassignments."
The Court found these factors equally applicable in the
copyright context and used them to determine that
purchasers of game software enjoy both the expectation
that they can resell what they have bought as well as the
legal right to do so.
The resale of video game software also takes place
in the United States, but no serious impediments seem to
have been erected to the practice. Unlike Japanese law, the
U.S. has no special reservation of distribution rights for film
producers. Rather, film producers, like all other copyright
holders, have the right "to distribute copies ... of the
copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of
ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending." "
In the case of motion pictures, distribution to
theatres for display is the first, but only one, of many methods
of exploiting one's copyright. The theatre obtains a license
to exhibit the film, yet is given no rights of ownership in the
physical medium in which the motion picture is fixed.To the
contrary, the delivery of the celluloid and its return are
typically explicitly denoted in the contract and, in any event,
are well-known trade customs.
One model contract very carefully defines the scope
of the license and its limitations:
1. Subject to the payment of the license fees specified
in the Schedule (which is hereby made a part of this
agreement) and all the other terms and conditions
hereof, the Distributor hereby grants to the Exhibitor,
and the Exhibitor hereby accepts from the Distributor,
a limited license under the copyright of the Picture to
exhibit the same publicly, but only at the Theatre and
for the period and commencement date set forth in
the Schedule. This license shall extend to no other
time, place, use or purpose.
2. License Restrictions:The License herein granted shall
extend only to the exhibition of the specific print of
the Picture delivered by the Distributor to the
Exhibitor ... and shall not extend to the exhibition
of any other print [or the use of reels of any other size).
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6. Return of Print:The Exhibitor shall, immediately after
the last exhibition of the Picture, return the print tails
out, and the reels and containers furnished therewith
(a) to the Distributor's local exchange from which
the Exhibitor was served, or (b) to a common carrier
designated by the Distributor. The Distributor shall
pay the cost of transportation. If directed by the
Distributor to ship the print elsewhere, the Exhibitor
shall so ship it, transportation charges collect.38
Following the theatrical distribution (often very
quickly thereafter, if ticket sales are not impressive), the film
may be licensed to cable television, television, international
markets, and/or airline in-flight entertainment.These are all
licenses to exhibit, as compared with what is often the final
step in the chain: direct sales to consumers of copies fixed
in videotape and videodisk.
Compared with this elaborate cycle seen in the
distribution of films, video game software distribution is
unadorned by time limits and returns of prints and other
restrictions.The works, "audiovisual works,' to be precise, 9
are sold first and last to consumers in the medium of a
physical object that the consumer may possess. Consumers
are thus free to transfer that physical object as they see fit.
Copying or public performance would be illegal, but transfer
is not.
The video game rental industry has become a
mainstay oftheAmerican entertainment landscape; however,
the rapid advances of the telecommunications industry may
change its business model. Just as rental of DVDs is migrating
to online services, so too is that of game software. Right
now, the typical company operates like a video rental shop,
purchasing multiple copies of the most popular titles, but
some companies are looking to other business models to
stock their shelves. 40 GetAnyGame, for example, solicits
individual game owners to send in their unwanted games,
rather than trading them or reselling them for a small amount
of the original purchase price.The company offers to send
the consumer $2 each time "his" game is rented to another.
Renters pay a flat monthly fee of $20 and are allowed to
keep the rented games as long as they like.4'
The software industry, however, may be poised to
regain control from the migration of games from hard-copy
to on-line environments. As on-line gaming proliferates, the
need for physical copies of software diminishes, eliminating
the distribution gap between producer and consumer. High-
speed connections and more powerful processors allow not
only access to sophisticated games, but also the attraction
of competing with other players in real time. As with the
music industry, the role of distribution companies, at least as
they are now, would seem in jeopardy.
Distribution companies in the music industry have
been, and continue to be, confronted with a number of new
alternatives to their established way of doing business. A
step in that direction is the iTunes Apple Music Store started
at the end of April 2003. The five major recording labels are
participating in the project, in which users can download any
of 200,000 titles for 99 cents apiece.The software is designed
to limit copying to no more than two additional Macs.
42
Other sites authorized by recording companies and
artists also are springing up after the legal battles surrounding
Napster4 3 and MP3.com, in which on-line music exchanges
were found to violate copyright law.' While the recording
industry is still looking for the business model that will satisfy
both listeners and producers, the momentum toward some
form of on-line delivery-without hard copies-may serve
as a roadmap for video game software producers, and an
opportunity for such producers to expand their influence.
Video games present a legal problem that may be
more difficult for courts to solve than the games themselves.
In Japan, each court took a somewhat different approach. In
its opinion, the Tokyo District Court tried to differentiate
between movies and video games by focusing on the role of
the audience.That court emphasized the fact that while movie
audiences are passive and have no effect on the course of
the movie, video game audiences actively affect the
progression of the storyline.To illustrate the difference that
the Tokyo Court emphasized, consider the Pokemon cast.
They were originally characters in a Nintendo video game,
but have since also become the stars of a motion picture
(and sequels).The movie is the same whenever and wherever
it is seen by juvenile aficionados and their parents. Pokemon
the game, however, will differ depending on the player's skill
and luck.
41
While this is an enticing theory, it does not entirely
hold true. Contrary to the Court's conclusion that video
game audiences have some real control over the storyline,
the very notion of a game involves matters that are not within
the player's complete control. The creator of the game, like
that of a movie, has determined the narratives and sequences.
Indeed, the game creator has determined what the results
of the player's actions will be.
Relying on this distinction could have severe
consequences for the video game industry. For if authorship
is denied completely, then the game producers would seem
to have no claim to copyright in any form, meaning that the
authors would not even be able to assert copyright rights
over the first sale of the game, much less any subsequent
sales. If an analogy is to be drawn from traditional copyright
at all, the more apt one would seem to be derivative works,
46
in which a subsequent author makes use of an existing
copyrighted work: a musical play based on a novel, for
example. In that situation, the underlying copyright is not
extinguished. To the contrary, the subsequent author must
obtain the right to use it in order to exploit what he has
separately created.
Yet even that analogy fails, because, unlike true
derivative works, the players of video games do not fix their
contribution in any tangible form. One commentator
compared a video
game to an unedited
film, in which the
selection of pictures
and sequences has not
yet occurred.47 He v
emphasized that
editing is an essential r
element of what is
generally recognized as
a movie. Explaining that t
the presence of a
skillful editor, or the lack
of one, may make the
difference between a masterpiece and a piece that is soon
forgotten, this commentator argued for a more strict
understanding of the fixation requirement.
48
On the other hand, in the United States, Nimmer
notes that while fixation requires sufficient permanency
or stability to allow more than transitory perception, this
is satisfied, in the case of video games, by the features that
do appear the same, no matter how the game proceeds.
49
With video games, although sequences may develop in
different ways, the characters and their on-screen
environment are certainly determined by the author of
the game and not by the player. To give a pedestrian but
easily-understandable example, Super Mario may be capable
of many things, but one thing he is not capable of is
becoming Pikachu from the Pokemon game.
Whether either of these approaches is correct,
at least they both look to the statutory definition of the
objects at issue, the works themselves.That, after all, is the
essential challenge facing courts.The courts are not deciding
how video games should be treated in an ideal world, but
rather determining how they are viewed under the
statutory world that legislatures create.
Of all the options available to it, the Supreme Court
of Japan took the practical approach. Insofar as results only
are concerned, the decision certainly seems reasonable.The
movie industry and the video game industry have been
substantially different, in production, use, and distribution. It
is certainly true that, unlike sellers of video games, producers
of theatrical films guard the prints jealously, destroying most
of them after the film has completed its first run. 0
Perhaps, however, the two worlds are moving closer together.
Indeed, a number of participants have migrated between the
two, with games becoming movies"' and movie actors and





e t dc replaced by images
e i ndbroadcast to theatres
through secure satellite
Sngsignals.5 3 Even so, the
movie and videogame
industries have grown
ie up in different ways,
and society has come
to view them (quite
literally) differently as
well.The problem is not so much the result as it is the process
of reaching the result, in particular-where it was made.
The Japanese legislature hardly had video game
software in mind when it enacted the copyright law in 1970.
The language it selected for motion picture-type products
and their distribution rights was broad. One might well believe
that it was intentionally so, in order not to confine the
medium to existing technology. The question has therefore
become should the courts save the legislature from its own
language, even when it is far from clear that the legislature
wishes such a rescue operation? One commentator suggests
that the Supreme Court's decision
can be highly regarded in that, by compensating ...
for the legal vagueness, it properly interprets law to
show a certain direction in the midst of the
ambiguousness regarding the broadening concept of
"cinematographic work;" the Supreme Court in this
case ascertains the part of law they can interpret in
correspondence with the emergence of unexpected
situations, and tries to flexibly interpret such part in
pursuit of proper results.
5 4
The consequence of such result-oriented
jurisprudence, however, resounds beyond the immediate case.
First of all, there is the circular problem of courts tailoring
decisions to achieve particular results, no matter how laudable
they may be, rather than confronting the law as it is.
Secondly, the courts' rewriting of the statute, creating a new
distinction of exhausted and unexhausted cinematographic
distribution rights, has the effect of cutting off the legislature's
own consideration of the problem. 5 This is not a question
of a vague statute. Rather, it is a statute that is quite clear but
directs results that the Court finds inappropriate.
Of course, the Diet can now act and supplant the
decision if it wishes. However, that is unlikely, if for no other
reason than the decision has solidified both consumer and
business expectations. Even if the Diet chooses to enter
the discussion, it does so on the basis of an altered legal
landscape in which the Court has changed the law rather
than done the hard work of enforcing it and letting the
legislature decide whether some new approach is necessary,1
6
Copyright law, however, is a legislative creation, and
the Japanese legislature should face the issue.The legislature
chose to create a broad definition of cinematographic works.
If video game software, which meets the criteria of the
definition, is to be treated differently, the legislature should
make that determination, not the courts.The public and the
law would be better served by full consideration by elected
representatives rather than judicial reconstruction.There are
a number of ways in which the Diet could choose to address
videogame software, from fitting it into the existing broad
definition to creating an entirely new category. Regardless,
though, of how videogames are ultimately to be treated under
copyright law, this is a decision that should be made by the
legislature and not the courts.
In his dissent to the Betamax case on home
videotaping in the United States, nearly twenty years ago,
Justice Blackmun said,"courts cannot avoid difficult problems
by refusing to apply the law.We must'take the CopyrightAct
... as we find it,"7 and 'do as little damage as possible to
traditional copyright principles ... until the Congress
legislates'""8 While it may be too late for the Japanese courts
to take such a deferential view of the copyright law, it is not
too late for the Japanese legislature to revisit the law and to
reach its own conclusion about how to respond to rapidly
changing technologies.
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